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Abstract:  
We study the effects of tax shocks on the budget and external deficits for 16 
industrialized countries over the post-1975 period. Our structural approach is based on a 
tractable small open-economy model where a tax cut innovation generates a budget 
deficit. In turn, the budget deficit affects the external deficit by two distinct channels. The 
demographic channel works through the overlapping-generation structure of the model. 
The forecasting channel works through the dynamic structure of the model. Our 
empirical analysis documents that tax shocks generate significant positive comovements 
between the budget and external deficits. We also find that both the demographic and 
forecasting channels are important to explain the comovements. 
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1. Introduction
The last few years have seen renewed interests on the impact of government budget deficits
on the economy, and in particular on external deficits (e.g. Bartolini and Lahiri 2006;
Beetsma, Klaassen, and Giuliodori 2008; Bussiere, Fratzcher, and Muller 2005; Chinn
2005; Corsetti and Muller 2006 and 2008). One view is that large budget deficits reduce
aggregate savings and generate external deficits. This is often coined the twin deficits
hypothesis. The empirical support for this view in international data, however, is slim. As
shown in Figure 1, the budget and external deficits series do not display a homogenous
pattern of positive comovements among industrialized countries.
In part, the lack of homogenous evidence of twin deficits occurs because the raw data
jointly captures the effects of several shocks. These shocks may simultaneously push the
budget and external deficits in different directions. To isolate the effects of specific shocks,
we use a structural approach. The approach is based on a tractable small open-economy
model with overlapping generations for which the solution takes the form of restricted
vector autoregressions (VARs). We employ the model to verify whether fiscal policy shocks
generate positive comovements between the budget and external deficits. The fiscal policy
shocks correspond to tax shocks because they are innovations of the budget deficit that
are orthogonal to government expenditures. In the model, a tax cut innovation raises
the budget deficit. In turn, the increase in the budget deficit may affect the external
deficit via two distinct channels. The demographic channel is standard in overlapping-
generation models. In these models, consumers can shift a portion of their future tax
burden to unborn generations. As a result, a tax cut innovation raises consumer’s wealth
and aggregate consumption, lowers aggregate saving, and raises the external deficit.
The forecasting channel is less standard, but occurs in most dynamic models. In
such models, agents require forecasts of future variables to make optimal choices. As
long as the budget deficit contains information useful to forecast the future, it will affect
optimal choices and thus the external deficit. As an example, consider the starve-the-beast
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hypothesis (Bartlett 2007, Romer and Romer 2008). If this hypothesis holds, a current
tax cut starves the beasts (by reducing government income) and eventually forces future
reductions in government expenditures. As a result, a tax cut innovation raises consumer’s
wealth and aggregate consumption, lowers aggregate saving, and raises the external deficit.
Our structural approach improves on the existing literature in several ways. First, be-
cause of its tractability, our approach permits a comprehensive study. Our empirical work
uses data for 16 industrialized countries over the 1975–2002 period. The sample includes an
Asian country (Japan), an Australian country (Australia), 12 European countries (Aus-
tria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and United Kingdom), and 2 North American countries (Canada and United
States). Although we make international comparisons, we mainly focus our analysis on
the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) plus Finland. This emphasis
simplifies the exposition without loss of generalities, because these countries exemplify the
disparity found across all the 16 countries. For example, Norway and Sweden display pos-
itive comovements between the budget and external deficits, while Denmark and Finland
do not (see Figure 1).
Second, our approach allows us to isolate tax shocks. The ability to eliminate the ef-
fects of other shocks is crucial to verify whether tax shocks generate positive comovements
between the budget and external deficits. To highlight the importance of this exercise, we
report the correlation between the deficits for two cases. For the first case, we simply com-
pute the correlation from the raw data. For our countries, these unconditional correlations
do not display a specific pattern. For example, we document a large positive and statis-
tically significant unconditional correlation between the budget and external deficits for
Norway and Sweden, but only a small and insignificant unconditional correlation for Den-
mark and Finland. For the second case, we compute the correlations as if the economy was
hit only by tax shocks. The resulting conditional correlations display an obvious pattern
consistent with twin deficits. The conditional correlations are large, positive, and signif-
icant for all countries. For example, the conditional correlations are 0.967 for Denmark,
0.977 for Finland, 0.812 for Norway, and 0.968 for Sweden.
Third, our approach allows us to study the propagation of tax shocks on both bud-
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get and external deficits of the different economies. We find that the large conditional
correlations are attributable to the positive responses of both deficits to a tax cut over
most horizons. A tax cut innovation generates a positive impact response of the budget
deficit for all countries, and a positive impact response of the external deficit for most
countries. For the countries that do not display the positive impact response, the external
deficit rises sharply soon after impact. Over time, the positive responses of the budget and
external deficits are persistent. In addition, we document that the tax cut has important
effects on the public and external debts for all countries. For example, after a decade, a
tax cut innovation that creates a contemporaneous currency unit budget deficit generates
an external debt of roughly 61 currency units in Denmark, 35 currency units in Finland,
60 currency units in Norway, and 44 currency units in Sweden.
Finally, our structural approach allows us to disentangle the effects of tax shocks.
Our tractable small open-economy model embodies demographic and forecasting channels
by which tax shocks affect the economy. Importantly, our approach allows us to study
each channel separately, because the model nests versions with and without each channel.
Our analysis reveals that both channels are important to understand the mechanisms by
which a tax cut generates positive comovements between the budget and external deficits.
Both channels work to produce positive conditional correlations between the deficits, and
to propagate the tax shocks through time. We document that the forecasting channel
explains the shape of the responses of the external deficit, while the demographic channel
explains the amplitude of the responses.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structural model and dis-
cusses the different channels by which a tax cut affects the external deficit. Section 3
presents the predicted VARs implied by the structural model. Section 4 discusses our
empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2. A Small Open Economy
Our small open-economy model is based on the overlapping-generation model of Blanchard
(1985). The model yields solutions where the budget deficit affects the external deficit via
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two distinct channels.
2.1 The Model
The demographic structure of the small open economy is as follows. We define the birth
rate to be p and the survival probability to be (1− p). Thus, the period t size of a cohort
that was born at any time s ≤ t is Ps,t = p(1− p)t−s, where Ps,s = p and total population
is P =
∑t
s=−∞ Ps,t = 1. As a result, the economy is populated by overlapping generations
of consumers when 0 < p < 1, but populated by a representative infinitely-lived consumer
when p = 0. Also, note that as a convention variables indexed by s and t refer to cohort-
specific variables, while variables indexed only by t refer to aggregate variables.
At time t, a consumer from the cohort that was born at time s chooses a stream of
consumption to solve
max
{Cs,t+j}
Et


∞∑
j=0
(
1
1 + ρ
)j
U(Cs,t+j)

 (1)
subject to
As,t+1 = (1 + ρ)(As,t + Ls,t − Ts,t − Cs,t). (2)
The term Et is the expectation operator conditional on period t information, Cs,t is con-
sumption, As,t = (Bs,t+Fs,t) is (non-human) wealth where Bs,t and Fs,t are the quantities
purchased of one-period home government and foreign bonds, Ts,t is lump-sum taxes, and
Ls,t is a non-insurable stochastic (labor plus dividend) income. Note that each consumer
inelastically supplies a unit of labor, such that labor supply equals total population. As
is standard, we assume the existence of insurance firms that make annuity payments to
consumers holding wealth during their lives. In exchange, the insurance firms inherit
the wealth at the consumer’s death. This implies that the gross return on wealth is
(1 + ρ) = (1 + r)/(1− p), where (1 + r) is the gross return on one-period bonds.
At time t, the firm chooses employment and investment to solve
max
{Nt,It}
Et


∞∑
j=0
(
1
1 + r
)t
Dt+j

 (3)
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subject to
Dt = Yt − wtNt − It, (4)
Yt = ZtKαt N1−αt , (5)
Kt+1 = It + (1− δ)Kt, (6)
where Dt is dividends, wt is the wage rate, Nt is employment, Zt is a stochastic productivity
shock, andKt is the capital stock. Aggregate income is defined as Lt ≡ wtNt+Dt = Yt−It.
In the competitive equilibrium, Nt = P = 1.
The home government faces the budget constraint
Bt+1 + B∗t+1 = (1 + r)(Bt +B∗t +Gt − Tt), (7)
where B∗t is the quantity purchased of one-period home government bonds by foreign
consumers, and Gt is the home government stochastic expenditures on goods and services.
The budget deficit is defined as
Dt =
(
r
1 + r
)
(Bt + B∗t ) +Gt − Tt. (8)
The term [r/(1 + r)] (Bt + B∗t ) denotes debt servicing and (Gt−Tt) is the primary deficit.
The external deficit is defined as the negative of the current account. The current
account is measured as the sum of net income from foreign assets and the trade balance:
CAt =
(
r
1 + r
)
(Ft −B∗t ) +Qt − Ct. (9)
The term [r/(1 + r)] (Ft − B∗t ) denotes net income from foreign assets and Qt − Ct is
the trade balance, where Qt ≡ Yt − It − Gt is net output (output net of investment and
government expenditures).
2.2 The Rules
We solve the model as follows (see Technical Appendix). First, assuming quadratic pref-
erences, we solve the consumer’s problem to obtain cohort-specific consumption functions.
Second, we aggregate across consumers to get the aggregate consumption function. Third,
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we use the aggregate consumption function to substitute out consumption from the current
account equation (9). This yields the optimal rule for the current account:
CAt = −
(
p
1 + r
)
At −
(ρ− r
ρ
)
Dt + xt, (10)
where
xt = −
∞∑
j=1
(
1
1 + ρ
)j
Et
[
∆Qt+j +
(
ρ− r
ρ
)
∆Dt+j
]
. (11)
Equation (10) relates the current account to wealth, the budget deficit, and the adjusted
current account xt. Equation (11) states that the adjusted current account represents the
purely forward-looking component of the rule. Note that the forward-looking component
depends exclusively on two forcing variables: the change in net output ∆Qt ≡ Qt −Qt−1
and the change in the budget deficit ∆Dt ≡ Dt−Dt−1. Empirically, expressing the purely
forward-looking component of the rule as a function of ∆Qt and ∆Dt ensures stationarity.
In addition, note that the current change in net output is unaffected by tax policies (see
Technical Appendix).
Fourth, the optimal rule for aggregate wealth is derived from the aggregate consumer’s
budget constraint and the aggregate consumption function. The result is
At+1 = (1− p)At + (1 + r)
(
r
ρ
)
Dt + wt+1, (12)
where
wt+1 = −(1 + r)
∞∑
j=1
(
1
1 + ρ
)j
Et
[
∆Qt+j +
(
ρ− r
ρ
)
∆Dt+j
]
, (13)
where wt+1 denotes adjusted wealth.
For completeness, the rules are coupled with a law of motion for forcing variables. For
now, we model the law of motion that drives these variables as
(
∆Qt+1
∆Dt+1
)
=
(
pi11 pi12
pi21 pi22
)(
∆Qt
∆Dt
)
+
(
Q,t+1
D,t+1
)
or
Ht+1 = ΠHt + Vt+1. (14)
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We use the process (14) to construct the forecasts of future forcing variables in the
forward-looking rules (11) and (13). The adjusted current account reduces to
xt = θ′Ht (15)
or xt = θ1∆Qt + θ2∆Dt where θ′ = ( θ1 θ2 ) and θ′ = − (e ′1 + [(ρ− r)/ρ]e ′2) [Π /(1 + ρ)]
[I − Π /(1 + ρ)]−1 for e1 = ( 1 0 )′, e2 = (0 1 )′, and I is the identity matrix. Also,
adjusted wealth reduces to
wt+1 = (1 + r)θ′Ht. (16)
2.3 Tax Cuts and Twin Deficits
For a given contemporaneous government expenditure, a tax cut innovation clearly results
in a budget deficit. To engineer a twin deficit, the budget deficit must generate an external
deficit. The relation between the budget and external deficits is obtained from the general
expression CAt = − [p/(1 + r)]At − [(ρ− r)/ρ]Dt + xt where xt = θ1∆Qt + θ2∆Dt.
Thus, the budget deficit affects the current account by the term − [(ρ− r)/ρ] and by the
parameter θ2 = − (e ′1 + [(ρ− r)/ρ]e ′2) [Π /(1 + ρ)] [I −Π /(1 + ρ)]
−1 e2.
This solution embeds two different channels by which the budget deficit affects the
external deficit. The demographic channel operates via the demographic structure of the
model, and is controlled by the birth rate p. The forecasting channel operates via the
dynamic structure of the law of motion, and is controlled by the parameter pi12. A simple
way to understand the mechanisms of these channels is to first consider a case where both
channels are closed (p = 0 and pi12 = 0). In this case, the current account reduces to
CAt = xt = θ1∆Qt, so that the external deficit is unaffected by the budget deficit. Then,
from this benchmark we can sequentially study the effects of opening only one channel.
The effects of the demographic channel depend on the birth rate p. When 0 < p < 1,
the economy is populated by overlapping generations, and consumers can shift a frac-
tion (0 < [(ρ− r)/ρ] < 1) of their tax burden to unborn generations. In this case, the
solution for the current account remains as in the general expression, but with θ2 =
−[(ρ − r)/ρ]e ′2 [Π /(1 + ρ)] [I −Π /(1 + ρ)]
−1 e2. Then, a tax cut that raises the budget
deficit may raise consumer’s wealth, lower aggregate saving and the current account, and
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thus raise the external deficit. In contrast, when p = 0, the economy is populated by an
infinitely-lived consumer, and the consumer must bear the full tax burden ([(ρ− r)/ρ] = 0).
In this case, a tax cut does not generate a twin deficit.
The effects of the forecasting channel depend on the parameter pi12. When, pi12 6= 0,
changes in the budget deficit Granger-cause changes in net output. In this case, the solution
is CAt = xt = θ1∆Qt + θ2∆Dt, where θ2 = −e ′1 [Π /(1 + ρ)] [I − Π /(1 + ρ)]
−1 e2. Thus
a tax cut that raises the budget deficit may signal changes in future net output. As an
example, consider the starve-the-beast hypothesis where tax cuts signal lower government
expenditures in the future, and thus higher future net output. Then, the tax cut may
raise consumer’s wealth, lower aggregate saving and the current account, and thus raise
the external deficit. In contrast, when pi12 = 0, changes in the budget deficit do not signal
changes in future net output, and as such a tax cut does not generate a twin deficit.
3. The Empirical Approach
We wish to study the effects of a tax cut on the budget and external deficits of several
countries. To do so, we first operationalize the solutions, by restating them as VARs. We
then test the main restrictions imposed by the model and provide estimates for the birth
rate.
3.1 The VARs
The solutions (15) and (16) show that the adjusted current account and adjusted wealth
are functions of the whole vector of exogenous variables. The solutions embed the effects of
both demographic and forecasting channels. Importantly, the forecasting channel operates
through the forecast of future forcing variables. However, there may be omitted variables
that help forecast future forcing variables, so that the the law of motion (14) is misspecified.
To ensure that the law of motion is well specified, we follow Boileau and Normandin (2002).
That is, we assume that the law of motion for forcing variables is
Ht+1 = ΠHt +Vt+1, (17)
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where Ht = (∆Qt ∆Dt ht )′ and Vt = ( Q,t D,t h,t )′. The variable ht sum-
marizes all variables that contain information useful to forecast future forcing variables.
We then use (17) to construct the forecasts in the forward-looking rules (11) and (13).
This yields xt = θ′Ht and wt+1 = (1 + r)θ′Ht where θ ≡ ( θ1 θ2 θ3 )′ and θ′ =
− (e′1 + [(ρ− r)/ρ]e′2) [Π/(1 + ρ)] [I−Π/(1 + ρ)]
−1 for e1 = (1 0 0 )′, e2 = (0 1 0 )′,
and I is the identity matrix.
Unfortunately, we have no detailed knowledge about the additional variable ht. The
new solution however suggests that the measurable adjusted current account xt summarizes
all the relevant information required to forecast future forcing variables. That is, we can
rewrite the solution in vector form as
Xt = ΘHt, (18)
where Xt = (∆Qt ∆Dt xt )′ and Θ = ( e1 e2 θ )′. Equation (18) is used to rewrite
the law of motion (17) as
Xt+1 = ΓXt +Ux,t+1, (19)
where Γ = ΘΠΘ−1 and Ux,t = ΘVt. This suggests that an unrestricted version of the
VAR (19) can be used to make adequate forecasts of future forcing variables.
Applying this insight to construct the forecasts in the forward-looking rule (11) results
in
x̂t = υ′Xt, (20)
where x̂t is the predicted value of the adjusted current account, and the vector of parameter
is υ′ = − [e′1 + ((ρ− r)/ρ)e′2] (Γ/(1 + ρ)) [I− Γ/(1 + ρ)]
−1. This yields the predicted VAR:
X̂t+1 = ΓxX̂t + Ûx,t+1, (21)
where X̂t = (∆Qt ∆Dt x̂t )′, Γx = ΥΓΥ−1, Ûx,t = ΥUx,t for Υ = ( e1 e2 υ )′.
For completeness, we specify the unrestricted VAR for adjusted wealth as
Wt+1 = ΨWt +Uw,t+1, (22)
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where Wt = (∆Qt ∆Dt wt+1 )′. Using the VAR (22) to forecast the future forcing
variables in rule (13) yields the predicted VAR:
Ŵt+1 = ΨwŴt + Ûw,t+1, (23)
where Ŵt = (∆Qt ∆Dt ŵt+1 )′, Ψw = ΦΨΦ−1, Ûw,t = ΦUw,t, Φ = ( e1 e2 φ )′,
Φ = −(1 + r) [e′1 + ((ρ− r)/ρ)e′2] (Ψ/(1 + ρ)) [I−Ψ/(1 + ρ)]
−1, and ŵt is the predicted
adjusted wealth.
3.2 Birth Rates and Model Restrictions
The VARs involve the adjusted current account and adjusted wealth, which are measured
from observables and the parameters r and p. We calibrate the value of the real interest
rate to r = 0.01 per quarter. We estimate the value of the birth rate p by exploiting the
orthogonality restrictions implied by the null hypothesis that the model is valid. Under
the null, the predicted and actual adjusted current accounts are the same: x̂t = xt. This
implies that εt = xt − (1 + ρ)xt−1 − ∆Qt − ((ρ− r)/ρ)∆Dt must be orthogonal to all
lagged variables (see Technical Appendix).
Table 1 presents the actual birth rate ℘ as well as different estimates of the birth
rate based on the orthogonality restrictions. Our estimates use post-1975 quarterly data
for 16 industrialized countries, including Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden (see
Data Appendix). The estimate p and p are the smallest and largest values for which the
orthogonality conditions are not rejected at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels of significance.
These bounds are obtained by performing a grid search for the values of the birth rate and
selecting those for which all the coefficients associated with the regression of εt on xt−1,
∆Qt−1, and ∆Dt−1 are jointly insignificant. The estimate p̂ is a generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimate. For this, we exploit the orthogonality between εt and a vector
that includes a constant, ∆Qt−1, and ∆Dt−1.
First, the numerical values of the lower bound p are strictly positive and the higher
bound p is strictly smaller than unity at the 1 percent level for all countries. The 1 percent
level bound p is 0.1 percent for most countries, with the exception of 0.3 percent for the
Netherlands. The 1 percent level bound p ranges from a low of 1.3 percent in Germany
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to a high of 7.7 percent in Italy. At other levels, the bounds are not always defined. For
those that are defined, the lower bound p is strictly positive and the higher bound p is
strictly smaller than unity.
Second, the GMM estimates p̂ are not statistically different from the lower bound p
for all countries. The estimates p̂ fall inside the 1 percent bounds for all countries, but
Germany and Norway. Although the birth rate estimates p̂ are imprecised, the overiden-
tifying restrictions related to the GMM estimates are never rejected. The implication is
that the orthogonality restrictions statistically hold for all countries.
Third, the actual birth rates ℘ range from a low of 1 percent per quarters in Germany
to a high of 1.5 percent in Australia, Canada, and the United States. The actual birth
rates ℘ fall inside the 1 percent level bounds p and p for all countries. Importantly, the
restrictions of the model hold for the actual birth rate ℘ at the 1 percent level for all
countries, including the Scandinavian countries.
4. Results
We first describe the data. We then use the predicted VARs to construct the responses of
the budget deficit and the external deficit to a tax cut.
4.1 Data Description
Figure 1 plots the ratio of the external deficit to output and the ratio of the budget deficit
to output for all the countries in our sample. A visual inspection suggests that the two
deficits are positively correlated in some countries (e.g. Italy and Norway), but negatively
correlated for others (e.g. Canada, Spain, and United Kingdom). For example, the budget
deficit of Canada, France, Italy, and Spain show a similar pattern. The budget deficit was
relatively high in the mid-70s, high in the mid-80s, and high again in the mid 90s. In
contrast, for the same time periods, the external deficit was relatively low in Canada and
Spain, high in Italy, and somewhere in between in France. For other countries, there are
no sizeable correlations between the two deficits. For example, starting from the early 90s,
the budget deficit started to climb rapidly in Japan, without any sizeable movements in the
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external deficit. During the same period, the external deficit plummeted in Switzerland
without any sizeable movements in the budget deficit. As for the whole group of countries,
the Scandinavian economies do not display a specific pattern. There are strong positive
comovements between the budget and external deficits for Norway and Sweden, but not
for Denmark and Finland.
Table 1 provides estimates of the unconditional contemporaneous correlation between
the external deficit ratio and the budget deficit ratio. The two deficits are positively corre-
lated in some countries and negatively correlated for others. The unconditional correlation
ranges from a low of -0.468 for Canada to a high of 0.643 in Norway. It is negative for 9
countries and positive for 7 countries. As expected, the Scandinavian countries do not dis-
play a specific pattern. There is a large positive and statistically significant unconditional
correlation between the two deficits for Norway and Sweden, but a small and insignificant
unconditional correlation for Denmark and Finland.
So far, the data show little evidence of a general pattern of twin deficits. Importantly,
the unconditional correlations jointly capture the effects of several shocks, and do not
provide enough information to isolate the effects of specific shocks such as tax cuts.
4.2 Tax Cuts and Twin Deficits
Table 2 provides estimates of the conditional contemporaneous correlation between the
budget deficit ratio and the external deficit ratio. To isolate the effects of taxes, the
conditional correlations are computed from the predicted VARs (21) and (23), assuming
that the economy is hit only by fiscal policy shocks (see Technical Appendix). The shocks
correspond to tax shocks, because they are innovations of the budget deficit that are
orthogonal to net output (which is constructed from output, investment, and government
expenditures). For this exercise, the correlations are computed for a benchmark calibration
that uses a quarterly real interest rate of r = 0.01 and the actual birth rate ℘. Recall that
the actual birth rate falls well within the range of values for which the model’s orthogonality
restriction holds for all countries.
Importantly, the conditional correlations generated by our benchmark calibration dis-
play a systematic pattern of twin deficits for all the countries. The positive conditional
12
correlations are all numerically large and significantly different from zero. The conditional
correlations range from a low of 0.416 for Switzerland to a high of 0.993 for Austria. The
conditional correlations are 0.967 for Denmark, 0.977 for Finland, 0.812 for Norway, and
0.968 for Sweden.
Intuitively, the positive conditional correlations between the budget and external
deficits can be attributed to the positive responses of both deficits to a tax cut over
most horizons. To see this, Figure 2 displays the dynamic responses of the budget and
external deficits to a fiscal policy shock. The dynamic responses are computed using the
predicted VARs (21) and (23) (see Technical Appendix). The fiscal policy shock is a pos-
itive orthogonal innovation of the budget deficit, normalized to unity. Thus, the figure
shows the dynamic responses to an unexpected unit increase of the budget deficit that is
exclusively due to an unexpected tax cut. Figure 3 shows the probability values of the
test that the response of the external deficit is null for each period. The test relies on a
χ2(1) statistic and accounts for the uncertainty associated with the estimated parameters
in the unrestricted VARs. To be concise, we do not present the probability values for the
responses of the budget deficit, but those are statistically significant for all countries (these
results can be obtained from the authors).
By design, the fiscal policy shock generates unit positive impact responses of the
budget deficit for all countries. The positive responses of the budget deficit are highly
persistent for most countries. Focusing on the Scandinavian countries, the responses appear
extremely persistent for Norway, but less so for Denmark, Finland, and Sweden. As
previously stated, these responses are statistically significant.
The fiscal policy shock also generates large positive impact responses of the external
deficit for most countries. The impact responses of the external deficit are close to unity
for several countries. That is, a one unit rise in the budget deficit due to a tax cut leads to
a one unit rise in the external deficit. Exceptions include the negative impact responses for
Australia, Japan, and Norway, as well as the very large positive impact responses of Finland
and Sweden. For the countries that initially display negative responses, the external deficit
rises sharply soon after impact. Finally, the responses of the external deficit appear very
persistent for many countries, but much less so for Finland, Italy, Sweden, and the United
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States.
Figure 3 shows that the impact responses of the external deficit are significant for
most countries. The impact responses are not statistically different from zero for Australia
and Japan, two of the four countries that display impact reductions of the external deficit.
The impact responses are also statistically null for Denmark and Germany. Over time, the
responses are significant for most countries, but become insignificant for some (Finland,
France, Italy, Sweden, and United States).
Finally, we evaluate the effects of a tax cut on the public and external debts at
different horizons. The responses of the debts are obtained by cumulating the responses
of the deficits. To be concise, we do not present the responses of the public debt, but
they are positive and significant at all considered horizons. Table 3 provides the responses
of the external debt at impact, after 5 years, and after a decade. After a decade, the
responses are positive and significant for most countries. More importantly, the rises are
economically meaningful. For example, a Danish Krone increase in the budget deficit of
Denmark raises their external debt by 0.825 Krone at impact, 36.897 Kroner after five
years, and 61.036 Kroner after a decade. For the other Scandinavian countries, a tax cut
innovation that creates a current currency unit budget deficit generates an external debt
of roughly 35 currency units in Finland, 60 currency units in Norway, and 44 currency
units in Sweden after a decade.
Overall, these results provide ample evidence that a tax cut generates twin deficits.
The positive conditional correlations between the budget and external deficits are large
and significant. The positive and significant dynamic responses of the two deficits explains
the conditional correlation and describe the mechanism by which the tax cut is propagated
through time. Finally, the responses of the deficits have large economic repercussions on
the public and external debts.
4.3 Demographic versus Forecasting Channels
To disentangle the effects of the different channels on the propagation of the fiscal policy
shock, we reproduce our empirical results while shutting down the different channels. In
what follows, the conditional correlations and dynamic responses are computed as before.
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To do so, we reestimate the full structural model for the different parametrizations. This
implies small differences in the responses of the budget deficit to the fiscal policy shock,
but the responses remain significantly positive at all horizons.
The results under no demographic are computed for a version of our structural model
that closes the demographic channel. These results appear in Figures 4 and 5, as well as
Tables 2 and 3. For this, we set the birth rate to the lower bound p for which the restrictions
of the model hold. Although these values are not strictly null, they are small enough that
the demographic channel is virtually closed. With this parametrization, consumers find it
very difficult to shift their tax burden to unborn generations.
The results under no forecasting are computed for a version of our structural model
that closes the forecasting channel. The results appear in Figures 6 and 7, as well as Tables
2 and 3. For this, we employ a law of motion where the changes in the budget deficit and
in net output follow univariate autoregressive (AR) processes. As such, the matrix Π in
VAR (17) is strictly diagonal, which forces Γx to be lower triangular. In that sense, current
budget deficits contain no information useful to forecast future changes in net output, and
this closes the forecasting channel. With this parametrization, the starve-the-beast type
mechanism is absent.
The conditional correlations suggest that both channels are important for the deter-
mination of twin deficits. The positive conditional correlations are large and statistically
significant, although smaller for the no demographic channel than for the no forecasting
channel. For the no demographic channel, the conditional correlations range from 0.253 for
the Netherlands to 0.950 for France. The conditional correlations are 0.730 for Denmark,
0.788 for Finland, 0.505 for Norway, and 0.913 for Sweden. For the no forecasting channel,
the conditional correlations range from 0.897 for Italy to 0.997 for France, the Netherlands,
and Sweden. The conditional correlations are 0.985 for Denmark, 0.984 for Finland, 0.989
for Norway, and 0.997 for Sweden.
To understand the transmission of the fiscal policy shock, we compare the dynamic
responses of the external deficit obtained under each channel to those obtained with the
benchmark calibration of the model. The comparison suggests that the amplitude of the
benchmark responses is attributable to the demographic channel, while the shape of the
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benchmark responses is attributable to the forecasting channel. For the no demographic
channel, the dynamic responses of the external deficit have similar shapes, but smaller
amplitudes than the responses generated by the benchmark calibration of the model. Ex-
ceptions include Finland and Italy. Interestingly, although the responses are fairly small,
they are still statistically different from zero in a number of countries, notably Canada
and the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the cumulated responses of the external deficit are
often small and insignificant. For the Scandinavian countries, the dynamic responses of
the external deficit are small and eventually significant for Denmark and Norway, but are
always insignificant for Finland and Sweden. Also, the cumulated responses of the external
deficit are all insignificant.
For the no forecasting channel, the dynamic responses of the external deficit are large
and persistent, but do not display the shapes generated by the benchmark calibration.
As a result, the cumulated responses of the external deficit are all large and significant.
Note that the restrictions imposed by univariate AR processes ensure that the responses
are precisely estimated. For the Scandinavian countries, the dynamic responses and the
cumulated responses of the external deficit exhibit the features documented for the other
countries.
These results suggest that the demographic and forecasting channels are important
in understanding how a tax cut generates twin deficits. Both channels work to produce
positive conditional correlations between the deficits. In particular, the forecasting channel
explains the shape of the responses of the external deficit, while the demographic channel
explains the amplitude of the responses.
5. Conclusion
We study the effects of tax shocks on the budget and external deficits of industrialized
economies over the post-1975 period. To do so, we employ a tractable small open-economy
model with overlapping generations for which the solution takes the form of restricted
VARs. In the model, a tax cut innovation raises the budget deficit. In turn, the increase
in the budget deficit may affect the external deficit via two distinct channels. The demo-
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graphic channel is standard and occurs when consumers can shift a portion of their future
tax burden to unborn generations. The forecasting channel is less standard, and occurs
when agents require forecasts of future variables to make optimal choices.
We find that tax shocks generate positive comovements between budget and external
deficits for all the countries in our sample. Conditioning on tax shocks, the correlation
between the budget and external deficits are large, positive, and significant. These condi-
tional correlations are attributable to the positive responses of both deficits to a tax cut
over most horizons. Finally, we find that both demographic and forecasting channels play
a role in producing positive comovements. That is, the forecasting channel explains the
shape of the responses of the external deficit, while the demographic channel explains the
amplitude of the responses.
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Technical Appendix
The Forward-Looking Rules
The forward-looking rules for the current account and wealth are derived from the con-
sumer’s problem. The consumer chooses consumption to maximize lifetime utility (1) sub-
ject to the budget constraint (2). Assuming that consumers have quadratic preferences,
consumption is a martingale:
Et [Cs,t+1] = Cs,t. (A.1)
Using the budget constraint (2), the Euler equation (A.1) is solved to yield the individual
consumption function
Cs,t =
(
ρ
1 + ρ
)
As,t +
∞∑
j=0
(
1
1 + ρ
)j
Et [Ls,t+j − Ts,t+j ]

 . (A.2)
We aggregate cohort-specific consumption functions (A.2) and budget constraints (2)
to obtain the aggregate consumption function and the aggregate budget constraint:
Ct =
(
ρ
1 + ρ
)
At +
∞∑
j=0
(
1
1 + ρ
)j
Et [Lt+j − Tt+j ]

 (A.3)
and
At+1 = (1 + r) (At + Lt − Tt − Ct) , (A.4)
where Ct =
∑t
s=−∞ Ps,tCs,t, At =
∑t
s=−∞ Ps,tAs,t =
∑t
s=−∞ Ps,t [Bs,t + Fs,t] = Bt + Ft,
and At+1 =
∑t+1
s=−∞ Ps,t+1As,t+1 = (1 − p)
∑t
s=−∞ Ps,tAs,t+1 = Bt+1 + Ft+1. Following
Gali (1990), we assume that income and taxes are identical across consumers of different
cohort, Ls,t = Lt and Ts,t = Tt, such that aggregate labor income and taxes are Lt+j =∑t
s=−∞ Ps,tLs,t+j and Tt+j =
∑t
s=−∞ Ps,tTs,t+j.
To obtain the rule for the external deficit, we restate the consumption function in terms
of the changes in net output ∆Qt ≡ Qt − Qt−1 and in budget deficit ∆Dt ≡ Dt − Dt−1.
Following Normandin (1999), we replace tax revenues with Tt+j = [r/(1 + r)] (Bt+B∗t ) +
(1 + r)
∑j−1
k=0Dt+k +Gt+j −Dt+j in the consumption function (A.3):
Ct =
[(
ρ
1 + ρ
)
(Bt + Ft)−
(
r
1 + r
)
(Bt + B∗t )
]
+
[
Qt +
(
ρ− r
ρ
)
Dt
]
+
∞∑
j=1
(
1
1 + ρ
)j
Et
[
∆Qt+j +
(
ρ− r
ρ
)
∆Dt+j
]
. (A.5)
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Substituting (A.5) in the current account equation (9) yields
CAt = −
(
p
1 + r
)
At −
(ρ− r
ρ
)
Dt
−
∞∑
j=1
(
1
1 + ρ
)j
Et
[
∆Qt+j +
(
ρ− r
ρ
)
∆Dt+j
]
. (A.6)
Using the aggregate budget constraint (A.4) and the consumption function (A.3), the rule
for wealth is
At+1 =(1− p)At + (1 + r)
(
r
ρ
)
Dt
− (1 + r)
∞∑
j=1
(
1
1 + ρ
)j
Et
[
∆Qt+j +
(
ρ− r
ρ
)
∆Dt+j
]
. (A.7)
Income, Investment, and Output
In the model, current income, investment, output, and net output are unaffected by tax
policies. To see this, consider the firm’s problem. At time t, the firm chooses labor and
investment to maximize the present value of dividends (3) subject to the definition of
dividends (4), the production technology (5), and the accumulation equation (6). The
optimality conditions are
wt = (1− α)Yt/Nt, (A.8)
1 + r = Et [α(Yt+1/Kt+1) + 1− δ] . (A.9)
Note that, in equilibrium, Nt = P = 1, Yt = ZtKαt , Lt ≡ wt + Dt = Yt − It, K1−αt+1 =
(α/(r + δ))Et [Zt+1], It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt, and Qt = Yt − It −Gt. As a result, contem-
poraneous income Lt, investment It, output Yt, and net output Qt are unaffected by tax
policies.
The Orthogonality Conditions
The orthogonality conditions ensure that, under the null hypothesis that the model is
valid, the actual and predicted adjusted current accounts are the same: x̂t = xt. Recall
that x̂t = υ′Xt for υ′ = − [e′1 + ((ρ− r)/ρ)e′2] (Γ/(1 + ρ)) [I− Γ/(1 + ρ)]
−1, and that xt =
e′3Xt. Thus, under the null,
− [e′1 + ((ρ− r)/ρ)e′2] (Γ/(1 + ρ)) [I− Γ/(1 + ρ)]
−1 = e′3. (A.10)
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Post-multiplying both sides of (A.10) by (1+ρ) [I− Γ/(1 + ρ)]Xt−1 and rearranging yields
[e′3 − e′1 − ((ρ− r)/ρ)e′2]Xt − (1 + ρ)e′3Xt−1 = [e′3 − e′1 − ((ρ− r)/ρ)e′2]Ux,t, (A.11)
where Xt = ΓXt−1 +Ux,t. From (A.11), we define
εt ≡ [e′3 − e′1 − ((ρ− r)/ρ)e′2]Xt − (1 + ρ)e′3Xt−1. (A.12)
Equation (A.12) states that εt is a function of observables, as well as r and p (via ρ):
εt = xt −∆Qt − ((ρ− r)/ρ)∆Dt − (1 + ρ)xt−1. Also from (A.11), note that
εt = [e′3 − e′1 − ((ρ− r)/ρ)e′2]Ux,t. (A.13)
Equation (A.13) shows that εt is an innovation. In our empirical work, we exploit the
orthogonality between this innovation and lagged variables to estimate the birth rate.
The Conditional Measures
We compute the conditional contemporaneous correlation between the budget deficit ratio
and the external deficit ratio using the predicted VARs (21) and (23), but where we
only retain the orthogonal innovations to the budget deficit. For this, we use Cholesky
decompositions of the covariance matrices of the innovations Ux,t and Uw,t. As such,
the vector of orthogonal innovations are Ξx,t = Λ−1x Ux,t and Ξw,t = Λ−1w Uw,t, where Λx
and Λw are lower triangular matrices with positive elements on the diagonal such that
ΛxΛ′x = E(Ux,tU′x,t) and ΛwΛ′w = E(Uw,tU′w,t). We then retain the orthogonal tax
innovations and discard the other shocks. We feed these tax innovations in the predicted
VARs to obtain simulated paths of the change in net output, the change in the budget
deficit, the adjusted current account, and adjusted wealth. Finally, the simulated data
are used to compute the budget deficit to net output ratio and the external deficit to net
output ratio.
We also construct the dynamic responses of the budget and external deficits using
predicted VARs. The jth response of the change in the budget deficit to the fiscal policy
shock is R∆D,j = e′2ΓjxΥΛxe2, where we normalize the shock to unity. Then, the jth
response of the level of the budget deficit is constructed by summing the responses of the
change in the budget deficit:
RD,j =
j∑
i=0
R∆D,i. (A.14)
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Also, the jth response of the adjusted current account and adjusted wealth are Rx,j =
e′3ΓjxΥΛxe2, and Rw,(j+1) = e′3ΨjwΦΛwe2, where we normalize the shock to unity. Finally,
the jth response of the current account is
RCA,j = Rx,j −
(
p
1 + r
)
RA,j −
(
ρ− r
ρ
)
RD,j, (A.15)
where RA,j is constructed from
RA,(j+1) = Rw,(j+1) + (1− p)RA,j + (1 + r)
(
r
ρ
)
RD,j , (A.16)
for RA,0 = 0 (since wealth is predetermined).
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Data Appendix
The quarterly seasonally adjusted measures are constructed for the post-1975 period, using
raw data from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) released by the International
Monetary Funds, the Economic Outlook (EO) published by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, and the World Development Indicators (WDI) reported by
the World Bank. The countries (samples) are Australia (1975-I to 2002-IV), Austria (1975-I
to 1998-IV), Canada (1976-II to 1995-III), Denmark (1981-1 to 1999-IV), Finland (1975-I
to 1998-IV), France (1975-I to 1998-IV), Germany (1975-I to 1998-IV), Italy (1975-I to
1998-IV), Japan (1977-I to 2004-IV), Netherlands (1977-I to 1998-IV), Norway (1975-I to
2003-IV), Spain (1975-I to 1998-IV), Sweden (1980-I to 2004-IV), Switzerland (1977-I to
2004-IV), the United Kingdom (1975-I to 1998-I), and the United States (1975-I to 2006-
III). Germany refers to West Germany and Unified Germany for the pre- and post-1990
periods.
Current Account
The current account is the product of the nominal current account in US dollars (source:
IFS) and the nominal exchange rate of national currency units per US dollar (source:
IFS), divided by a price index. For Norway and Switzerland, the nominal current account
is interpolated from an annual to quarterly frequency by the algorithm Distrib (source:
RATS) over the subsamples for which quarterly data are unavailable. Otherwise, the
nominal current account is seasonally adjusted by the exponential smoothing algorithm
Esmooth (source: RATS). Also, for Germany the price index is the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) deflator (source: IFS). For the other countries, the price index is the all-item
consumer price index (CPI) (source: IFS).
Budget Deficit
The budget deficit is defined as the negative of the nominal budget surplus in national
currency divided by the price index. For Japan, the nominal budget surplus is obtained
by multiplying the sum of the primary surplus to GDP ratio (source: EO) and the net
interest income to GDP ratio (source: EO) by the nominal GDP in national currency
(source: IFS). For the other countries, the nominal budget surplus is directly collected
(source: IFS). For Australia, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland the
nominal budget surplus is interpolated over the subsamples for which quarterly data are
unavailable. Otherwise, the seasonality in the nominal budget surplus is removed.
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Net Output
Net output is measured as nominal GDP in national currency (source: IFS) minus the
sum of nominal government expenditures in national currency (source: IFS) and nominal
investment expenditures in national currency (source: IFS), normalized by the price index.
For Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, nominal GDP as well as nominal
investment and government expenditures are transformed to remove seasonal effects.
Wealth
Wealth is the sum of the nominal net foreign assets in US dollars (source: Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti 2007) adjusted by the nominal exchange rate of national currency units per
US dollar (source: IFS) and the nominal domestic government debt in national currency,
deflated by the price index. For all countries, the nominal net foreign assets is interpolated
from an annual to quarterly frequency.
For Japan, the nominal government debt is obtained by multiplying the nominal
government debt to GDP ratio (source: EO) by the nominal GDP in national currency
(source: IFS). For Australia and Denmark, the nominal government debt is measured as
the product of the nominal debt service (source: IFS) and the reciprocal of the annuity
factor (1 + r)/r, where the nominal debt service is interpolated and the interest rate r is
fixed to 4 percent per year. For the other countries, the nominal government debt is directly
collected (source: IFS). For Austria, Canada, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom, the nominal government debt is interpolated over some subsamples.
For France, Netherlands, and Sweden, the nominal government debt is transformed to
remove seasonal effects.
Birth Rates
Birth rate refers to the sample average of birth rates (source: WDI).
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Table 1. Birth Rates
Country Level p p p̂ ℘
Australia 1 0.001 0.035 0.001 0.015
5 0.001 0.027 (0.002)
10 0.001 0.022 [0.741]
Austria 1 0.001 0.053 0.032 0.012
5 0.001 0.027 (0.035)
10 0.001 0.008 [0.410]
Canada 1 0.001 0.030 0.003 0.015
5 0.006 0.021 (0.004)
10 — — [0.220]
Denmark 1 0.001 0.015 0.010 0.012
5 0.001 0.002 (0.018)
10 — — [0.321]
Finland 1 0.001 0.045 0.006 0.013
5 0.004 0.023 (0.004)
10 — — [0.973]
France 1 0.001 0.075 0.023 0.014
5 0.001 0.060 (0.022)
10 0.001 0.051 [0.288]
Germany 1 0.001 0.013 0.021 0.010
5 — — (0.031)
10 — — [0.288]
Italy 1 0.001 0.077 0.027 0.011
5 0.001 0.065 (0.037)
10 0.004 0.058 [0.951]
Japan 1 0.001 0.048 0.003 0.011
5 0.001 0.042 (0.014)
10 0.001 0.039 [0.404]
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Table 1 (Continued). Birth Rates
Country Level p p p̂ ℘
Netherlands 1 0.003 0.048 0.016 0.013
5 — — (0.025)
10 — — [0.259]
Norway 1 0.001 0.039 0.063 0.013
5 0.001 0.008 (0.034)
10 — — [0.162]
Spain 1 0.001 0.026 0.004 0.013
5 — — (0.012)
10 — — [0.232]
Sweden 1 0.001 0.034 0.016 0.012
5 0.001 0.007 (0.021)
10 0.001 0.001 [0.265]
Switzerland 1 0.001 0.033 0.005 0.011
5 0.001 0.038 (0.014)
10 0.001 0.049 [0.831]
United Kingdom 1 0.001 0.075 0.010 0.013
5 0.001 0.055 (0.014)
10 0.001 0.044 [0.525]
United States 1 0.001 0.051 0.005 0.015
5 0.008 0.040 (0.004)
10 — — [0.151]
Note: Entries are the estimated and actual values of the birth rate. p and p are the smallest and largest
values of the birth rate for which the orthogonality restrictions are not rejected at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels of significance. p̂ represents the GMM estimates of the birth rate. ℘ is the actual birth rate for the
period. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the GMM estimates. Entries in brackets are
the probability values associated with the J-test of overidentification restrictions.
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Table 2. Correlations Between Budget and External Deficits
Conditional
Country Unconditional Benchmark No Demographic No Forecasting
Australia −0.264 0.914 0.692 0.966
(0.088) (0.015) (0.033) (0.006)
[0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Austria 0.217 0.993 0.812 0.982
(0.090) (0.002) (0.032) (0.004)
[0.016] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Canada −0.468 0.960 0.767 0.987
(0.088) (0.008) (0.043) (0.003)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Denmark 0.167 0.967 0.730 0.985
(0.124) (0.011) (0.053) (0.005)
[0.180] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Finland −0.099 0.977 0.788 0.984
(0.103) (0.004) (0.042) (0.004)
[0.333] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
France −0.140 0.968 0.950 0.997
(0.092) (0.007) (0.010) (0.001)
[0.126] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Germany 0.433 0.720 0.339 0.983
(0.089) (0.062) (0.117) (0.003)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000]
Italy 0.423 0.881 0.461 0.897
(0.065) (0.024) (0.081) (0.016)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Japan −0.025 0.605 0.853 0.978
(0.063) (0.050) (0.021) (0.003)
[0.690] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
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Table 2 (Continued). Correlations Between Budget and External Deficits
Conditional
Country Unconditional Benchmark No Demograhpic No Forecasting
Netherlands 0.165 0.492 0.253 0.997
(0.091) (0.081) (0.089) (0.001)
[0.069] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000]
Norway 0.643 0.812 0.505 0.989
(0.061) (0.047) (0.105) (0.002)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Spain −0.430 0.965 0.338 0.971
(0.071) (0.005) (0.103) (0.005)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
Sweden 0.476 0.968 0.913 0.997
(0.055) (0.006) (0.013) (0.001)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Switzerland −0.310 0.416 0.390 0.987
(0.057) (0.074) (0.074) (0.002)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
United Kingdom −0.433 0.990 0.945 0.994
(0.099) (0.002) (0.011) (0.001)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
United States −0.129 0.957 0.759 0.978
(0.074) (0.007) (0.043) (0.005)
[0.081] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Note: Entries are the GMM estimates of the contemporaneous correlation between the ratios of external
and budget deficits relative to output. Unconditional refers to the correlations computed from the raw
data. Conditional refers to the correlations computed conditioning on only orthogonal budget deficit
shocks. Benchmark refers to the version of the model with the actual birth rate and no restrictions on
the law of motion for forcing variables. No Demographic refers to a variant of the benchmark that uses
the lower bound of the birth rate. No Forecasting refers to a variant that restricts the law of motion to
univariate AR processes. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates and entries in
brackets are the probability values associated with the test that the correlation is null.
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Table 3. Cumulative Responses of External Deficits
Benchmark No Demographic No Forecasting
Country Quarter
Australia 1 −0.470 [0.360] −0.355 [0.257] 1.634 [0.000]
20 23.899 [0.000] 2.994 [0.007] 35.709 [0.000]
40 45.878 [0.000] 8.369 [0.000] 76.792 [0.000]
Austria 1 0.875 [0.000] 0.251 [0.078] 0.394 [0.000]
20 9.070 [0.000] 1.920 [0.106] 8.552 [0.000]
40 18.261 [0.000] 3.677 [0.012] 18.319 [0.000]
Canada 1 0.772 [0.077] 0.106 [0.727] 0.586 [0.000]
20 16.575 [0.000] 2.354 [0.056] 12.718 [0.000]
40 32.333 [0.000] 4.909 [0.000] 27.161 [0.000]
Denmark 1 0.825 [0.140] 0.307 [0.599] 1.334 [0.000]
20 36.897 [0.000] 11.053 [0.203] 62.731 [0.000]
40 61.036 [0.001] 18.994 [0.126] 27.161 [0.000]
Finland 1 1.755 [0.000] −0.211 [0.565] 0.572 [0.000]
20 25.111 [0.013] −2.228 [0.755] 12.422 [0.000]
40 34.869 [0.049] −1.562 [0.745] 26.600 [0.000]
France 1 1.003 [0.008] 0.213 [0.415] 0.453 [0.000]
20 14.571 [0.108] 3.180 [0.528] 9.813 [0.000]
40 28.969 [0.162] 6.250 [0.745] 20.968 [0.000]
Germany 1 0.665 [0.371] 0.380 [0.637] 1.096 [0.000]
20 23.428 [0.017] 9.279 [0.389] 23.921 [0.000]
40 51.532 [0.000] 23.526 [0.113] 51.578 [0.000]
Italy 1 1.088 [0.000] 0.251 [0.228] 1.001 [0.000]
20 16.254 [0.000] 3.364 [0.004] 21.824 [0.000]
40 23.914 [0.000] 7.399 [0.000] 46.969 [0.000]
Japan 1 −1.199 [0.328] −0.308 [0.621] 1.147 [0.000]
20 7.518 [0.743] 3.163 [0.698] 25.025 [0.000]
40 20.940 [0.599] 8.168 [0.481] 53.903 [0.000]
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Table 3 (Continued). Cumulative Responses of External Deficits
Benchmark No Demographic No Forecasting
Country Quarter
Netherlands 1 1.169 [0.074] 0.682 [0.246] 0.640 [0.000]
20 19.147 [0.006] 10.171 [0.073] 13.899 [0.000]
40 33.856 [0.000] 17.761 [0.020] 29.772 [0.000]
Norway 1 −1.786 [0.003] −1.623 [0.000] 1.234 [0.000]
20 24.755 [0.000] 1.477 [0.680] 26.930 [0.000]
40 59.934 [0.000] 6.814 [0.119] 57.891 [0.000]
Spain 1 0.958 [0.000] 0.101 [0.221] 0.536 [0.000]
20 11.759 [0.000] 1.778 [0.000] 11.628 [0.000]
40 19.506 [0.000] 3.942 [0.000] 24.892 [0.000]
Sweden 1 1.883 [0.031] 1.496 [0.609] 0.685 [0.000]
20 31.152 [0.130] 30.288 [0.636] 14.898 [0.000]
40 43.764 [0.249] 58.269 [0.672] 31.963 [0.000]
Switzerland 1 1.246 [0.084] 1.073 [0.361] 0.747 [0.000]
20 20.776 [0.116] 9.942 [0.669] 16.265 [0.000]
40 43.171 [0.109] 19.510 [0.681] 34.956 [0.000]
United Kingdom 1 0.920 [0.000] 0.145 [0.071] 0.545 [0.000]
20 12.752 [0.000] 2.089 [0.003] 11.831 [0.000]
40 21.247 [0.001] 4.290 [0.000] 25.328 [0.000]
United States 1 0.780 [0.061] 0.092 [0.932] 0.590 [0.000]
20 12.143 [0.267] 0.317 [0.987] 12.796 [0.000]
40 19.358 [0.329] −0.595 [0.987] 27.329 [0.000]
Note: Entries are the cumulated responses of the external deficit to a tax cut innovation. Benchmark
refers to the version of the model with the actual birth rate and no restrictions on the law of motion for
forcing variables. No Demographic refers to a variant of the benchmark that uses the lower bound of the
birth rate. No Forecasting refers to a variant that restricts the law of motion to univariate AR processes.
Numbers in brackets are the probability values associated with the test that the cumulated response is
null.
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Figure 1. Budget and External Deficits
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Note: The solid (dashed) lines represent the external deficit (budget deficit) to output ratios.
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Figure 2. Dynamic Responses: Benchmark
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Note: The solid (dashed) lines correspond to the dynamic responses of external (budget) deficits computed
with the actual values of the birth rates and no restrictions of the law of motion for forcing variables.
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Figure 3. Probability Values: Benchmark
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Note: The solid lines show the probability values that the dynamic responses of the external deficit are
null, where the responses are computed with the actual values of the birth rates and no restrictions of the
law of motion for forcing variables. The dashed lines show the 10 percent level of significance.
33
Figure 4. Dynamic Responses: No Demographic
Australia
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Finland
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Japan
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Sweden
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Austria
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
France
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Netherlands
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Switzerland
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Canada
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Germany
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Norway
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
United Kingdom
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Denmark
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Italy
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Spain
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
United States
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
The solid (dashed) lines correspond to the dynamic responses of external (budget) deficits computed with
the lower bound values of the birth rate and no restrictions of the law of motion for forcing variables.
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Figure 5. Probability Values: No Demographic
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Note: The solid lines show the probability values that the dynamic responses of the external deficit are
null, where the responses are computed with the lower bound values of the birth rates and no restrictions
of the law of motion for forcing variables. The dashed lines show the 10 percent level of significance.
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Figure 6. Dynamic Responses: No Forecasting
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Note: The solid (dashed) lines correspond to the dynamic responses of external (budget) deficits computed
with the actual values of the birth rates and univariate AR processes for the law of motion.
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Figure 7. Probability Values: No Forecasting
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Note: The solid lines show the probability values that the dynamic responses of the external deficit are
null, where the responses are computed with the actual values of the birth rate and univariate AR processes
for the law of motion. The dashed lines show the 10 percent level of significance.
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